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Abstract
We assess the eﬀects of monetary policy on bank risk to verify the existence of a
risk-taking channel — monetary expansions inducing banks to assume more risk. We
ﬁrst present VAR evidence conﬁrming that this channel exists and tends to concentrate
on the bank funding side. Then, to rationalize this evidence we build a macro model
where banks subject to runs endogenously choose their funding structure (deposits
vs. capital) and risk level. A monetary expansion increases bank leverage and risk.
In turn, higher bank risk in steady state increases asset price volatility and reduces
equilibrium output.
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11 Introduction
According to a growing stream of opinion, the 2007 ﬁnancial crisis originated from mis-
incentives in the ﬁnancial markets leading to excessive leverage and risk-taking by ﬁnancial
institutions. High liquidity and persistently low interest rates, combined with lenient bank
supervision, allegedly induced banks to ﬁnance an increasing volume of risky assets — largely
in the real estate sector — by means of cheap short-term funding. This line of argument
calls into question the links between monetary policy and ﬁnancial risk-taking. Largely
neglected prior to the crisis — with some notable exceptions, mentioned below — such links
are now increasingly discussed1, but two elements are missing to provide a foundation to the
argument: realistic macroeconomic models that endogenize risk taking behavior and relate
it to monetary policy, and time-series evidence documenting this relation.
We move in that direction in two ways. First, we look at time series evidence on the
link between monetary policy and risk taking. The empirical literature has been conﬁned
to survey and panel data evidence; no aggregate-level time series tests are available. Tests
involving aggregate dynamics are important because interest rate changes are likely to in-
ﬂuence bank balance sheet risk in diﬀe r e n tw a y sa td i ﬀerent time lags: in the short run, risk
is likely to be positively correlated with interest rates, but in the longer run this relation
may be inverted if the risk-taking channel dominates. Our time series evidence supports the
notion that monetary policy inﬂuences risk-taking in the banking sector after some lags via
changes in the funding side. Second, we propose a model with risky banks that rational-
izes such channel. Fundamental bank runs in our model arise as a discipline device from
uninformed investors holding short term liabilities subject to service constraints: when a
run materializes, banks liquidate projects and this entails a resource cost. Low policy rates
reduce the cost of short term ﬁnance to banks and, if protracted, provide an implicit guar-
antee that indirectly impairs market discipline. When rates are low, banks substitute bank
capital with short term funding, raising bank riskiness. In the end this leads to an aggregate
1For a recent review of the debate see Dell’Ariccia et al. [12].
2resource costs for the economy.
Banks endogenously choose between two sources of funding, demand deposits and bank
capital, to ﬁnance risky investment projects. Bank managers have an informational ad-
vantage on the projects they ﬁnance and act as relationship lenders on behalf of outside
ﬁnanciers. To insure against the possibility that bank managers withhold their skills, depos-
itors threaten a run when news about projects returns become common knowledge2.B a n k
managers are compensated based on a bargaining agreement which maintains their incen-
tives to maximize expected projects’ returns. A monetary easing reduces the cost of short
term liabilities relatively to the cost of bank capital. Higher bank leverage increases bank
riskiness, measured by the probability of a bank run occurring.
A novel aspect of our framework consists in embedding bank runs into a macro model
for policy analysis. Diamond and Dybvig [13] modelled banks runs in a partial equilibrium
and static context: they analyzed panic runs triggered by liquidity shocks on depositors.
Since then, the banking literature has evolved; on the one hand, empirical evidence3 has
documented a correlation between banks’ runs and changes in fundamentals; on the other,
the notion of run proposed by Diamond and Dybvig [13] does not lend itself easily to policy
analysis, because of the diﬃculty of pinning down an endogenous probability of bank runs
(there are two rational equilibria, each with equal probability). For this reason the theoretical
banking literature moved towards considering fundamental and information-based bank runs,
ultimately triggered by bad news on investment returns. We follow this latter notion of bank
run, embedding it into a macro model and analyzing its interaction with monetary policy.4
We obtain two main results. First, an expansionary monetary policy raises bank lever-
age and risk. Similar results obtain under a positive productivity shock, due to the fact
that monetary policy becomes more expansionary (the real interest rate declines) under the
2See Diamond and Rajan [14], [15], Allen and Gale [2], and more recently Angeloni and Faia [4]
3See among others Kaminsky and Reinhardt [18], Calomiris and Mason [10] for links between bank runs
and fundamentals.
4In a companion paper, Angeloni and Faia [4], which provides normative analysis within the same model,
we also show that our model is successful in matching the main macroeconomic and banking business cycle
statistics.
3assumption that the central bank target expected inﬂation. The eﬀects of the monetary
expansion on output and inﬂation are the conventional ones — they both rise — but they
are milder than in a corresponding model without banks; a dampening of monetary policy
transmission occurs because risk-taking by banks is contractionary, hence it compensates
in part the expansionary ﬁrst-round eﬀect. We also discuss the eﬀects of projects riskiness
(hence bank riskiness) on the long run levels and the volatility of output and assets prices.
The literature found extensive evidence that an increase in riskiness (as signaled by the ar-
rival of bad news) raises the volatility of output and reduces its long run level (see Bloom
[7]) as well as raises the volatility of asset prices and reduces its long run level (see Fostel
and Geanakoplos [16]). Our model conﬁrms those links, but highlights a new channel that
stems from the endogenous formation of risk: when investment project risk increases, and
as investors become aware of such increase, more bank runs occur. This raises the volatility
of bank funding and investment and lowers production prospects in the long run.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy review some recent literature
on the risk taking channel of monetary policy. In section 3 we present time-series evidence
on the transmission of monetary policy on bank risk in the US. In section 4 we present
our macro model with bank runs. In section 5 we analyse the model and its quantitative
properties, mostly in relation to our time series evidence. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Recent empirical evidence
The surge of interest for the implications of monetary policy on ﬁnancial risks after the
recent crisis contrasts sharply with the virtual absence of any reference to risk5 in the earlier
literature on monetary policy transmission. The classic 1995 survey by Mishkin, Taylor
and others in the Journal of Economic Perspectives [20] hardly mentions bank and ﬁnancial
risks at all. In the multi-country empirical study of monetary transmission in the euro
area conducted by the Eurosystem central banks, dated 2003 (see Angeloni, Kashyap and
5As explained earlier by risk here we mean mainly indicators of endogenous formation of risk, not merely
exogenous ﬁnancial shocks.
4Mojon [5]), indicators of bank risk are actually used in the econometric estimates of the
“lending channel”, but only to measure how changes in certain structural characteristics of
banking sector aﬀect the strength of the transmission, not because monetary policy may
itself inﬂuence those characteristics.
In a diﬀerent context, however, other authors had stressed the potential importance of
the link between monetary policy and ﬁnancial risks well before the onset of the ﬁnancial
crisis. Already in 2000, Allen and Gale [1] had provided a theoretical underpinning for these
ideas by showing how leveraged positions in asset markets create moral hazard: leveraged
investors can back-stop losses by defaulting, and this makes asset prices deviate from fun-
damentals. The link with monetary policy, clariﬁed in later work by Allen and Gale [2],
c o n s i s t si nt h ef a c tt h a ta g g r e g a t ec r e d i td e v e l o p m e n t si nt h ee c o n o m ya r e ,a tl e a s tp a r t l y ,
under the control of monetary authorities. Borio and Lowe [9], described how asset market
bubbles, leading to ﬁnancial risk and instability, can develop in a benign macroeconomic
environment, including high growth, low inﬂation, low interest rates and accommodative
monetary policy6.
To help the subsequent analysis, it is useful to distinguish between two diﬀerent channels
through which risk-taking behavior can operate. The ﬁrst refers to accumulation of excessive
risk on the funding side. An expansionary monetary policy may aﬀect the composition of
bank liabilities, altering the mix of capital (plus other stable funding sources) and short
term funding in favor of the latter. This channel operates in particular when short term
rates are low and the yield curve upward sloping. The second channel is via changes in the
degree of riskiness of the intermediary’s asset side. In presence of low and persistent interest
rates levels, asset managers of banks and other investment pools may have an incentive
to shift the composition of their investments towards a riskier mix (see for instance Rajan
[23]). Risk taking on the funding side may in fact initiate and amplify risk taking on the
6This seminal contribution was followed by a host of publications by economists at the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements calling for the adoption of a "macroprudential approach" to ﬁnancial stability including,
notably, a response of monetary policy to asset prices.
5asset side: as banks can transfer risk to outside ﬁnanciers, through higher leverage, their
incentive toward riskier investments increase. Statistical and anecdotal information conﬁrm
that ﬁnancial institutions of various sorts (banks, conduits and SIVs, investment funds,
insurance companies, etc.) on both sides of the Atlantic became riskier, in the pre-crisis
years, due to excessive leverage. Ample availability of funding induced banks to acquire
riskier loans: a striking example of that is the issuance of mortgage loans to individuals
without employment or income (so-called NINJA loans).
The empirical evidence on these transmission channels has grown fast in recent times.
So far the analysis has focused on micro-survey data and on a panel dimension. Maddaloni
and Peydró Alcalde [?] use evidence from a euro area lending survey to see whether monetary
policy inﬂuences the lending practices of banks. The survey allows to distinguish between
supply related factors (i.e. linked to bank-speciﬁc conditions) and demand related ones
(i.e. depending upon borrowers’ conditions). The authors use a panel regression to link the
survey results to alternative indicators of monetary policy. The proxy for monetary policy
has consistently signiﬁcant eﬀects: a monetary expansion leads to lower credit standards,
for corporate as well as personal loans. Moreover, the longer a given policy stance lasts, the
more eﬀect its seems to have.
Another recent paper (Altunbas et al. [3]) uses a more comprehensive sample and a
diﬀerent measure of bank risk. They consider over 600 listed European banks, in 16 countries,
for which Moody’s KMV has computed expected default frequencies (EDF hereafter). EDFs,
expressing market perceptions of the default probability at a given time horizon, are a widely
used measure of bank risk, shown to have predictive power in many cases. EDFs are obtained
translating, with a model, several market and balance sheet indicators into a single measure,
a time-varying probability of default at a speciﬁc time horizon. The authors make this the
dependent variable in a panel regression, that includes a variety of explanatory factors —
macroeconomic variables, market data, other bank characteristics — as well as monetary
policy. The results suggest that a decrease of short term rates reduces overall bank risk
6in the short run — as one would expect, since lower interest rates on impact improve the
ﬁnancial condition of borrowers via changes in the value of collateral — but increases it over
time. A plausible interpretation is that while the risk of existing loans is positively related to
the level of the policy-determined interest rate, the risk of loans that are issued subsequently
t ot h ei n c r e a s eo fs u c hr a t ei snegatively related to it, because the lending behavior of the
bank changes. Measures of the average risk of loans combine the two elements, hence one
tends to observe a switch in sign between the short and the long run.
In view of the possibility of these interacting dynamic eﬀects, empirical evidence of the
risk taking channel on macro-time series can be of considerable interest, but has so far been
missing. In the next session we move a step forward in the direction of testing the risk taking
channel at macro level7.
3 Time series evidence
In this section we report time series evidence on the eﬀect of monetary policy on bank risks,
trying also to shed light on the two channels through which monetary policy can aﬀect bank
risk: funding behavior vs. lending behavior.
We use a standard orthogonalized VAR model, with monthly US data over the period
1985 to 2008. We exclude the periods after 2008, where our monetary policy indicator
— the Federal Funds rate — is constant at zero, and when the monetary policy stance is
probably better proxied by other (non-standard) indicators. We adopt, with modiﬁcations,
the speciﬁcation used by Bloom [7] (see also Bloom et al. [8]). The VARs include a small set
of variables characterizing the macro-economy; the real sector is proxied by the ISM PMI
index, a widely used composite indicator of manufacturing performance8 and by total non-
7The aggregate time series perspective can be important also for two additional reasons. First, to verify
how signiﬁcant are these risk-inducing eﬀects at the macro level. Secondly, time series evidence allows us
to consider the endogenous response of monetary policy: VAR evidence would indeed allow us to verify
whether the endogenous response of monetary policy can neutralize or, on the contrary, encourage, risk
taking behavior.
8See http://www.investopedia.com/university/releases/napm.asp#axzz23cTGf96n for more information
on this index.
7farm industrial employment. On inﬂation we include CPI and commodity price inﬂation,
the latter in order to account for the global component of price dynamics. Besides monetary
policy (proxied, as mentioned already, by the federal funds rate), all other variables included
in the model are risk measures: we distinguish between funding risk and lending risk as
follows (details on the data are contained in the Data Appendix):
• Funding risk is proxied by the ratio of total market-based bank funding to total bank
assets. The numerator is obtained by subtracting from total bank liabilities total
customer deposits; the idea behind is that customer deposits, while being in principle
callable on demand, in practice have a very high average duration and hence can be
considered a stable form of funding. Other liabilities, that have grown sharply in recent
times, consist of very short term revolving funding instruments like short CDs, repos,
asset backed instruments and the like, carrying a non-contingent contractual return
and subject to roll-over risk. These funding sources are subject to sudden withdrawal
if market conﬁdence deteriorates.
• Lending risk is proxied by the percentage of ﬁrms tightening their credit standards on
loans to large and medium-sized enterprises. The idea behind this variable, obtained
from the Fed survey of business lending, is that a tightening of credit standards by
loan oﬃcers is usually driven by a perception of increased borrowers’ risk, and therefore
the former can be used as proxy of the latter. This variable, however, exists only at
quarterly frequency and hence we used it only to conduct robustness checks on the
results obtained with monthly data, as well as to obtain an estimate (on quarterly
data only) of the eﬀect of monetary policy on bank asset risk only, separate from that
on bank funding risk.
• Finally, we use a proxy of total bank risk, logically including both components just men-
tioned. As proxy we use the realized volatility of a bank stock price index, calculated
as the average daily absolute return of the index over each month.
8The three measures are meant to identify possible channel of transmission of monetary
policy to bank risk, respectively via the liability side, the asset side and both sides of the
balance sheet. In particular, we expect that, if there exist a "risk taking channel" of monetary
policy running via the funding side, the ﬁrst and last of the above proxies should decline
when monetary policy is tightened. If instead a risk taking behavior exists only on the
lending side, then the last two should show a signiﬁcant decline. If no risk taking channel to
banks exist, none should be signiﬁcant.
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FIGURE 1: Impulse response of output to monetary contraction (A), of bank risk to a monetary
contraction (B), of bank funding risk to a monetary contraction (c), and of output to bank risk (C)
Figure 1 shows a few results. The a contractionary monetary shock has the expected
signs on real output (panel A): the PMI index declines signiﬁcantly for about a year (con-
9ﬁdence bands at 90 and 95 levels are shown in the charts) and, less signiﬁcantly, also for
the next year or so9. Concerning measures of bank asset risk, the impulse responses es-
timated at quarterly frequency were never signiﬁcant, hence results are not reported. By
contrast, the monetary contraction signiﬁcantly reduces bank funding risk after about 12
months, conﬁrming the existence of a "risk-taking channel" on the funding side (panel B).
At short term horizon, however, the eﬀect is positive; this can be explained considering that
the return on market based funding instruments adjusts more quickly to changes in policy
rates than that of traditional customer deposits; hence its share tends to increase because its
demand increases. This is consistent with the evidence on money demand, showing that the
short term negative interest rate elasticity of narrowly deﬁned monetary aggregates is larger
in absolute value than that of broadly deﬁned aggregates. Next, note that our measure of
overall bank risk displays a response proﬁle broadly consistent with that of our funding risk
measure; positive in the short run, negative and signiﬁcant at longer lags (panel C). This,
in combination with the fact that the response of risk on the asset side is not signiﬁcant,
suggests that the response of bank risk to changes in policy rates is driven by what happens
to the liability side, speciﬁcally by the share of market based (as opposed to more stable)
sources of funding.
Finally, note that the measure of overall bank risk has a marked and signiﬁcant impact on
real output performance (panel D). This evidence is consistent with that presented by Bloom
[7], according to which an increase in ﬁnancial market risk is contractionary. This evidence
uses measures of risk taken from the stock market: the hypothesis (examined through VAR
evidence) is that an increase in asset risk aﬀects ﬁrms’ planning decision. We focus instead
on bank risk and advance an alternative hypothesis, to which we return below.
We conducted a number of checks to verify the robustness of our results. We ﬁrst
changed the deﬁnition and the measurement of our risk variables, replacing them with al-
9Inﬂation (not shown) drops on impact and rises subsequently. The fact that inﬂation tends to be
positively correlated with interest rate increases at 12-18 months horizon into the future is probably due to
the fact that the Fed responds systematically to expected future inﬂation, as required by its mandate.
10ternative proxies10; the results remained stable. Finally, as already mentioned, we ran all
estimates again on quarterly data; the results were stable, but signiﬁcance was somewhat
lower. Finally, in addition to the VARs we also calculated Granger causality tests. The re-
sults, not reported here but available on request, are consistent in their interpretation with
the results just described: we found evidence of causality from monetary policy shocks to
the proxy for funding risk, but not to other measures of risk.
4 A macroeconomic model with bank runs
The ﬁnancial side of our model features banks with an endogenous funding choice and
endogenous risk of bank runs. Banks receive two sources of funding: demand deposits and
bank capital. What we call, for simplicity, deposits are not traditional retail deposits, which
usually are largely insured. They are uninsured short term funding instruments (for example,
asset-backed securities, or repos), yielding a contractual non-contingent return set ex-ante,
and subject to "run" in the form of roll-over risk. These two funding sources are combined
to ﬁnance risky projects. Deposits are subject to a non-contingent service constraint, which
exposes banks to runs. If no run occurs, bank capitalists receive a rent, which compensates
them for the risk of losses in the run states. The bank is administered by a bank manager, a
"relationship lender " who by lending acquires a superior knowledge on the project’s quality.
The manager chooses the optimal funding structure (the optimal shares of demandable
deposits and bank capital) to maximize total expected returns to outside ﬁnanciers. The
bank manager’s superior skills eﬀectively create a moral hazard problem since the manager is
tempted to withhold its technology, forcing a costly liquidation of the loan. Those incentives
are disciplined in two ways. First, depositors can threat a run, a feature that eﬀectively
works as a discipline device. Second, the contractual agreement between the bank manager
and the outside ﬁnanciers takes the form of a bargaining arrangement in which the bank
10Concerning funding risk, the ratio of market funding to total assets was replaced by the ratio of inter-
bank funding to total assets. As a measure of overall bank risk we alternatively used the expected default
frequencies produced by Moody’s KMV.
11manager receives a fraction (depending on relative bargaining power) of the total returns:
ex post bank managers have thus incentives to maximize total expected returns from the
project.
The real sector of the model consists of a conventional DSGE model with nominal
rigidities; in a model used for policy analyses, the latter are useful because they help better
match the empirical evidence on monetary transmission on output and inﬂation.
5 Households
There is a continuum of identical households who consume, save, work and make portfolio
decisions. Households save by lending to ﬁnancial intermediaries, in the form of deposits and
bank capital. To allow aggregation within a representative agent framework we assume that
in every period a fraction  of household members are bank capitalists and a fraction (1−)
are workers/depositors11. Hence households also own ﬁnancial intermediaries. Bank capital-
ists remain engaged in their business activity next period with a probability  independent
of history12. Workers are employed either in the production sector or in the banking sector,
as bank managers; both return their earnings to the household. Bank dividends, earned
by bank capitalists who remain in business, are assumed to be passed on to the new bank
capitalists and reinvested in the bank (details below in section 5.2). Households maximize
the following discounted sum of utilities:
0
∞ X
=0

( ) (1)
11We could alternatively assume two set of households, one composed solely by risk averse workers and
one composed solely by ﬁnitely lived and risk neutral bank managers. This alternative assumption would
not aﬀect the main channels of the monetary transmission mechanism in our model. The only diﬀerence
would consist in the addition of a separate consumption function for bank capitalists. Since bank capitalists
consist of a small fraction of the population, their consumption would not quantitatively aﬀect the dynamic
of the real economy.
12This ﬁnite survival scheme is needed to avoid that bankers accumulate enough wealth to remove the
funding constraint. A fraction (1− ) of bank capitalists exit in every period, becoming workers, and a
corresponding fraction of workers become bank capitalists every period, so that the share of bank capitalists,
 and workers remain constant.
12where  denotes aggregate consumption and  denotes labour hours. Households save
and invest in bank deposits and bank capital (as explained above returns on ban capital are
reinvested), both entail some risk. Deposits,  pay a gross nominal contractual return .
Due to the possibility of bank runs, the return on deposits is subject to a time-varying risk;
the expected return on deposits is (1 − ),w h e r e is the probability of run and  is
explained in Appendix A13. Households own the production sector, from which they receive
nominal proﬁts for an amount, Θ.L e t be net transfers to the public sector (lump sum
taxes, equal to public expenditures). The budget constraint is14:
 +  +  ≤  + Θ + Ξ + −1(1 − −1−1)−1 (2)
where  is the unitary wage and Ξ are total revenues earned by bank managers. Households
choose the set of processes { }∞
=0 and deposits {}∞
=0 taking as given the set of
processes {  }∞
=0 and the initial value of deposits 0 so as to maximize 1 subject to
2. The following optimality conditions hold:


= −


(3)
 = 
∙

+1
(1 − )+1
¸
(4)
where +1 =
+1
 . Equation 3 gives the optimal choice for labour supply. Equation 4
gives the Euler condition with respect to deposits. Optimality requires that the ﬁrst order
conditions and no-Ponzi game conditions are simultaneously satisﬁed.
13Households could in principle invest their savings either lending directly to ﬁrms, or by acquiring bank
deposits. In the ﬁrst case, as uninformed investors they would be able to liquidate at most a fraction  of
their investment. As shown in the next section the bank can guarantee to the depositor, in case of run, a
payoﬀ at least equal to
(1+)(1−)(
 −)
2 . In our benchmark parametrisation, the worse case return for the
depositor if she invests in the bank is larger than the liquidation value  the depositor’s outside option.
This guarantees the depositor’s participation in the contract.
14Note that the return from, and the investment in, bank capital do not appear in equation 2, because
returns on bank capital are reinvested.
135.1 Intermediation sector
The intermediation sector collects funds from outside investors (demand depositors, holding
short term liabilities subject to a service constraint, and bank capitalists) and allocates them
to entrepreneurs, who undertake capital investment15.F i r m sﬁnance investment with bank
lending. The returns to capital investment has a general aggregate component, represented
by the marginal productivity of capital plus the capital gains obtained through the resale
market. The return accruing to the intermediary (bank) is subject to an idiosyncratic shock.
As already mentioned, the bank manager maximizes the total expected return to both ﬁ-
nanciers; since funding markets are competitive, this is equivalent to maximizing the bank
manager’s return, see Allen and Gale [2]. To maintain banks managers incentives’ to commit
his technological skills depositors can threat a run. It is assumed that depositors receive pre-
cise signals on the projects’ returns16: when returns are too low, a collective action problem
materializes and depositors run the bank. A run entails costly project liquidation, which also
produces aggregate resource costs. Outside ﬁnanciers and bank managers are also linked by
a contractual agreement, according to which bank managers receive ex post a share of total
expected returns. Linking bank managers’ fee to the expected returns through the bargain-
ing agreement helps to maintain managers’ incentive to maximize expected returns. The
presence of demandable deposits (as opposed to other long terms deposit contracts) avoids
the threat of renegotiation: any attempt of the bank manager to renegotiate the contract
will set oﬀ a run, which by forcing costly liquidation also destroy’s bank managers’ residual
claims17.
15To maintain consistency with the hypothesis of a relationship lender, we assume that each bank invests
in one project or in a small cluster of projects. The bank manager can indeed acquire information only by
monitoring consistently one or a small group of banks. This implies that ex ante we neglect the possibility
of full projects’ diversiﬁcation. Notice however that equilibrium runs would materialize even if the bank
invests in all projects as long as returns’ correlation is diﬀerent than zero. To maintain tractability we do
not consider this case, which would nevertheless be a relevant one.
16Alternatively one could think of depositors forming expectations about banks’ returns: those expec-
tations determine expected failure probabilities, thereby being fulﬁlled in equilibrium. See among others
Kaminsky and Reinhardt [18], Calomiris and Mason [10] for evidence on the links between banks runs and
fundamentals.
17See also Diamond and Rajan [14], [15] for a similar logic.
14Banks are heterogenous as they run projects whose realization is in general diﬀerent.
However, later on we will show that both the optimal share of deposits (and bank capital)
and the returns accruing to outside ﬁnanciers are linear with respect to project value. This
allows us to aggregate the equations characterizing the banking sector by simply taking
expected values. Based on this and for sake of simpliﬁcation we omit banks’ individual
subscripts from the start. Total funds, given by the sum of deposits () and bank capital,
(), equal bank lending.
 = +1 =  +  (5)
The liability structure of the bank, measured by the deposit share,  = 

18,i sd e t e r m i n e d
by the bank manager on behalf of the external ﬁnanciers. The manager sets the bank capital
structure so as to maximize the combined expected (with respect to the idiosyncratic shock
observed ex-post by the bank manager) return of depositors and capitalists, in exchange for
a fee, set according to the bargaining contractual agreement.
Individual depositors are served sequentially and fully as they come to the bank for
withdrawal; bank capitalists are rewarded pro-quota after all depositors are served. This
payoﬀ mechanism exposes the bank to runs, that occur when the uncertain return from the
project is insuﬃcient to reimburse all depositors. As soon as depositors realize that the
payoﬀ is insuﬃcient, they run the bank and force the liquidation of the project; in this case
the bank capital holders get zero while depositors get the market value of the liquidated
loan19.
The bank asset side yields an expected return 
 , homogenous across banks (the link
between the average return and the real economy is detailed below) but subject to an idio-
syncratic shock  with a uniform distribution deﬁn e di nt h es p a c e{−;} 20. As explained
18In our simple bank balance sheet the deposit share is the complement to unity of the capital share,
 =1− 
 . Hence we have a monotonic positive relation between  and the bank’s leverage, 

19As explained so far bank runs in this model work as discipline devices, hence, as also pointed out in
Diamond and Rajan [15], in this context deposit insurance is ineﬃcient as it distorts banks’ incentives.
20In Angeloni and Faia [4] we show that results are unchanged also when assuming a logistic or a normal
15above the bank is a relationship lender: by ﬁnancing the project, it acquires a specialized
non-sellable knowledge of its characteristics that determines an advantage in extracting value
from it before the project is concluded, relative to other agents. For this reason the bank
is able to repossess the entire return 
 + . If outside investors (depositors or bank cap-
italists) try to liquidate the project without the assistance of the bank manager, they are
able to obtain only a fraction  of the return. This gives the bank a bargaining power, that
allows to extract a rent, proportional to the remaining part (1−). Notice that, since bank
capitalists bear the risk of run, the bank manager rewards them in the no run states by
assigning them part of the rents, (1 − )
The timing is as follows. At time , the bank manager decides the optimal capital
structure, expressed by the ratio of deposits to the total cost of the project, , and collects
the funds. At time  +1 , the project’s outcome is revealed, the bank manager acquires the
return 
 , and payments to depositors and capitalists are made. A new round of projects
starts.
Even if the full value is extracted from the project, without loss of relationship knowl-
edge, a bank run entails a speciﬁcc o s t1 ≥ 0. W h e nar u no c c u r s ,t h ev a l u eo ft h e
project loses a constant fraction , that can be interpreted as arising from early liquidation.
Notice that this costs materializes only in the event that a run occurs.
Consider the payoﬀs to each of our players, namely the depositor, the bank capitalist
and the bank manager. Three possible cases arise.
Case A: Run for sure. The return is too low to pay depositors; 
 +  .P a y o ﬀs
in case of run are distributed as follows. Capitalists receive the leftover after depositors are
served, so they get zero in this case. Depositors, in absence of bank intervention, would get
only a fraction (1−)(
 +) of the project’s outcome. The remainder (1−)(1−)(
 +)
is split in half between depositors and the bank manager21. Therefore, depositors get
distribution. The uniform distribution is chosen as benchmark as it allows us to work out an analytical
solution of the deposit ratio and to gain intuition regarding the main mechanisms.
21In Angeloni and Faia [4] we show that diﬀerent bargaining share between outside investors and bank
managers would not aﬀect the results. The equal split is chosen for analytical simplicity.
16(1 + )(1 − )(
 + )
2
(6)
and the bank manager gets:
(1 − )(1 − )(
 + )
2
(7)
Case B: Run only without the bank. The return is high enough to allow depositors to
be served if the project’s value is extracted by the bank manager, but not otherwise; i.e.
(
 +)   ≤ (
 +). In equilibrium the run does not occur, so depositors are paid
in full, , and the remainder is split in half between the bank manager and the capitalists,
each getting

 +−
2 . Total payment to outsiders is

 ++
2 .
Case C: No run for sure. The return is high enough to allow all depositors to be served,
with or without the bank’s participation. This happens if  ≤ (
 + ).D e p o s i t o r s
get . However, unlike in the previous case, now the capitalists have a higher bargaining
power because they could decide to liquidate the project alone and pay the depositors in full,
getting (
 + ) − . This value is thus a lower bound for them. The bank manager
can extract (
 +)−: once again the surplus arising by the bank intervention is split
in half with the bank capitalists. Hence the bank manager gets:
©£
(
 + ) − 
¤
−
£
(
 + ) − 
¤ª
2
=
(1 − )(
 + )
2
(8)
an amount lower than the one the capitalist gets. Total payment to outsiders is:
(1 + )(
 + )
2
The manager chooses  to maximize the expected payoﬀ to outside investors; summing
up the total expected payments to them in the three cases delivers the following expression:
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2
−
 Z
−
(1 + )(1 − )(
 + )
2
 +
1
2

 −
 Z
−

(
 + )+
2
 + (9)
+
1
2
 Z

 −

(1 + )(
 + )
2

It Appendix B we show that the value of  that maximizes equation 9 is comprised in
the interval 

 +
   

 +
 . In this zone (see region D in our Appendix B), the third
integral in the equation vanishes and the expression reduces to:
1
2
−
 Z
−
(1 + )(1 − )(
 + )
2
 +
1
2
 Z
−

(
 + )+
2
 (10)
The above function is a piece-wise concave function (see graph in appendix B), hence
the second order condition is satisﬁed. Diﬀerentiating and solving for  yields the following
equilibrium condition:
 = 

 + 

(11)
Where  = 1
2−+(1+). Note that the equilibrium deposit ratio, , is inversely propor-
tional to ;t h i si ss t r a i g h t f o r w a r db e c a u s e and  appear only in multiplicative form in
the outsiders’ payoﬀ function 10. Moreover, , is directly proportional to 
 +, the upper
limit of the distribution of payoﬀs. The intuition can be grasped by inspecting equation
10. At the margin, an increase in the deposit ratio aﬀects the payoﬀ function through two
channels. First, by increasing the range of realizations of  where a run occurs (raising the
upper limit of the ﬁrst integral) and decreasing the range where a run does not occur (raising
the lower limit of the second integral). This eﬀect does not depend on either 
 or .T h e
second channel is an increase of the payoﬀ to outsiders for each  in the interval where a
run does not occur, i.e. the interval of the second integral of 10. This eﬀect is proportional
18to 
 +−, the size of this interval. From this we can see that the optimal  must be
h o m o g e n e o u so fd e g r e eo n ei n
 + . 22
Note also that the parameter  is positively related to  and negatively related to .
Intuitively, an increase of  (a higher cost of run) decreases the optimal deposit ratio, as
does a decrease of  (a stronger relationship lender eﬀect), for any given value of the bank
lending premium

 +
 .
From equation 11 we derive an expression for total bank capital as:
 =( 1− 
 + 

)+1 (12)
The last equation shows that our model also features a traditional banks’ balance sheet
channel: a fall in the policy rate, by raising asset prices also helps to boosts projects and
banks’ balance sheet values. An increase in the aggregate project value, +1 induces
banks to increase external ﬁnance, both in the form of demandable deposits and bank capital.
As explained above, following a fall in the policy rate, banks in our model tend to increase
the share of demandable deposits more than proportionally compared to bank capital. Such
a shift will also increase the probability of banks’ runs as we show next.
Finally, a our model allows us to compute the probability of occurrence of bank runs
which is deﬁned as follows:
 =
1
2
−
 Z
−
 =
1
2
µ
1 −

 − 

¶
(13)
22More formally, a marginal increase in the deposit ratio increases the range of  where a run oc-
curs, by raising the upper limit of the ﬁrst integral; this eﬀect increases the overall payoﬀ to outsiders
by 1
2
³
(1+)(1−)
2 
´
. A marginal increase in the deposit ratio also decreases the range of  where
a run does not occur, by raising the lower limit of the second integral; the eﬀect of this on the payoﬀ is
negative and equal to − 1
22
. Moreover, it also increases the return to outsiders for each value of  where
a run does not occurs; this eﬀect is 1
2
⎛
⎜
⎝
 Z
−

1
2
⎞
⎟
⎠ = 1
2
³

 +−
2
´
.E q u a t i n gt oz e r ot h es u m
of these eﬀects and solving for  yields equation 11.
19We will refer to  also as bank riskiness. Notice that a fall in the policy rate  raises
bank riskiness if it reduces 
 ,s i n c e1, as can be seen by substituting equation 13. The
negative relation between bank riskiness and the policy rate captures the essence of the
risk taking in our model. A fall in the policy rate lowers the cost of short term funding.
This induces the bank manager to shift toward short term funding as opposed to bank
capital, which instead comes along with the additional rents extractions. Certainly the bank
managers must balance the beneﬁts of cheaper external funding with the costs of an increase
in bank riskiness: on balance however it will prove convenient to increase the share of short
term lending, leading ex post to higher risks of bank runs. Although the bank manager acts
optimally from an individual point of view, higher probability of bank runs has ex post social
resource costs, given by the expected losses ensuing projects’ liquidation: atomistic bankers
do not internalize such social costs, thereby they leverage more than it would be optimal23.
5.2 Bank capital accumulation
After remunerating depositors and paying the fee to the manager, a return accrues to the
bank capitalist as retained earning. Bank capitalists who remain in business accumulate all
their returns. Bank capital accumulates from retained earnings as follows (again individual
subscripts are omitted since aggregation does not change the shape of the aggregate bank
capital accumulation)24:
 =


[−1 + 

 ] (14)
where 
 is the unitary return to the capitalist and  = 
−1 is inﬂation, which will
be deﬁned and derived in section 4.3 and which enters here since the accumulation involves
bank capital at diﬀerent dates. The parameter  is the bank survival rate. 
 can be
23Angeloni and Faia [4] provide a normative analysis of monetary policy and prudential regulation.
24We assume that bank capitalists who exit business in every period transfer their wealth to capitalists
who remain in business. Hence the aggregate wealth also includes an additional term (which, to facilitate
notation, we do not report in the equations of the main text): Σ = −1 This term is parametrized so
that bank net worth never falls below zero.
20derived from equation 10 as follows:


 =
1
2
 Z
−
(
 + ) − 
2
 =
(
 +  − )2
8
(15)
Note that this expression considers only the no-run state because if a run occurs the
capitalist receives no return. The accumulation of bank capital is obtained substituting 15
into 14:
 =


[−1 +
(
 +  − )2
8
] (16)
The bank capital structure depends on several counterbalancing factors. One can in-
terpret equation 12 as a "demand" for bank capital given the volume of loans  and the
interest rate structure (, 
 ), while equation 16 can be seen as a "supply" of bank capital
in the following period.
5.3 Intermediate Good Producers
Given that our focus is on the analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism, we also
allow for non neutral eﬀects of monetary policy; to that aim we introduce nominal rigidities,
by assuming quadratic adjustment costs on prices. Final goods in this economy are obtained
by assembling, though a conventional Dixit Stiglitz aggregator, intermediate goods. Each
ﬁrm  in the intermediate good sector has monopolistic power in the production of its own
variety and therefore has leverage in setting the price. In changing prices it faces a quadratic
cost equal to 
2(
()
−1() − 1)2 where the parameter  measures the degree of nominal price
rigidity. The higher  the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices. Each ﬁrm
assembles labour (supplied by the workers) and (ﬁnished) entrepreneurial capital to operate
a constant return to scale production function for the variety  of the intermediate good:
()=(() ())Each monopolistic ﬁrm chooses a sequence {() () ()}
taking nominal wage rates  and the rental rate of capital  as given, in order to maximize
expected discounted nominal proﬁts:
210{
∞ X
=0
Λ0[()() − (()+()) −

2
∙
()
−1()
− 
¸2
]} (17)
subject to the following aggregate demand constraint (•) ≤ ()=(
()
 )−,
where Λ0 =
+1
 is the households’ stochastic discount factor.
Let’s denote by {}∞
=0 the sequence of Lagrange multipliers on the above demand
constraint and by ˜  ≡
()
 the relative price of variety  After dividing the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
by the aggregate price  and taking ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain:


= ;


=  (18)
0=˜ 
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∙
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− 1
¸
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+{
∙
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¸
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˜ 2

}
where  is the marginal product of labour,  the marginal product of capital and
 = 
−1 is the gross aggregate inﬂation rate. Notice that all ﬁrms employ an identical
capital/labour ratio in equilibrium, so individual prices are all equal in equilibrium. The
Lagrange multiplier  plays the role of the real marginal cost of production. In a symmetric
equilibrium ˜  =1  After substituting the stochastic discount factor, and the condition for a
symmetric equilibrium, equation 19 takes the following form:
( − 1) = {+1(+1 − 1)+1} + (20)
+(•)


( −
 − 1

)
The above equation is a non-linear forward looking New-Keynesian Phillips curve, in which
deviations of the real marginal cost from its desired steady state value are the driving force
of inﬂation.
225.3.1 Capital producers
Investment decisions are taken by a sector of capital produces which faces adjustment costs:
the latter are introduced to obtain a time-varying price of capital, namely a conventional
Tobin’s Q. A competitive sector of capital producers combines investment, expressed in the
same composite index as the ﬁnal good, hence with price  and existing capital stock to
produce new capital goods. This activity entails physical adjustment costs. The correspond-
ing constant-returns-to-scale production function is ( 
) so that capital accumulation
obeys:
+1 =( 1− ) + (


) (21)
where (•) is increasing and convex. Deﬁne  as the re-sell price of the capital good.
Capital producers maximize proﬁts ( 
) −  implying the following optimal price
of assets: 
0( 
)=T h eg r o s s( n o m i n a l )r e t u r nf r o mh o l d i n go n eu n i to fc a p i t a lb e t w e e n
 and +1is composed of the rental rate plus the re-sell price of capital (net of depreciation
and physical adjustment costs):


 ≡  + ((1 − ) − 0(


)


+ (


)) (22)
The gross (real) return to entrepreneurs from holding a unit of capital between  and
+1is equalized in equilibrium to the gross (real) return that entrepreneurs return to banks
for their loan services, 
+1:

+1
+1
≡
 
+1

=
+1+1+1 + +1((1 − ) − 0(
+1
+1)
+1
+1 + (
+1
+1))

(23)
Equation 23 establishes that the aggregate return to capital must equate the marginal
productivity of capital, +1+1+1 plus the capital gains,
+1
  obtained by reselling
capital at the end of period  The capital sold at the end of period  is net of depreciation
and of the adjustment costs to investment.
235.4 Oﬃcial sector and market clearing
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by means of an interest rate reaction function
of this form:
ln
µ
1+
1+
¶
=
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´
+  ln
µ


¶¸
(24)
All variables at the denominator, without time subscript, are the target or steady state.
The government runs a balance budget and uses lump sum taxation to ﬁnance exogenous
government expenditure, hence  = .
Equilibrium in the ﬁnal goods market requires that the production of the ﬁnal good
equals private consumption, investment, public spending, and the various resource costs.
The combined resource constraints, inclusive of government budget, reads as follows:
 − Ω =  +  +  +

2
( − 1)
2 (25)
In the above equation,  is government consumption of the ﬁnal good which evolves
exogenously and is assumed to be ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes. The term 
2 ( − 1)
2
represents the aggregate costs associated with the price adjustment process. The term
Ω = 1
2
−
 Z
−

 +1 represents the expected cost of project liquidation in the
event of a run; it corresponds to the society’s resource loss due to bank risk, in expected
terms.
5.5 Parameter values
Household preferences and production. The time unit is the quarter. The utility function of
households is ( )=
1−
 −1
1− + log(1 −) with  =1  as in most real business cycle
literature. We set  set equal to 3, chosen in such a way to generate a steady-state level of
employment  ≈ 03. We set the discount factor  =0 99, so that the annual real interest
rate is equal to 4%. We assume a Cobb-Douglas production function (•)=
 ()1−
24with  =0 3 The quarterly aggregate capital depreciation rate  is 0.025, the elasticity of
substitution between varieties 6. The adjustment cost on capital takes the following form:
((

2)( 
 − )2) and the parameter  is set so that the volatility of investment is larger
than the volatility of output, consistently with empirical evidence: this implies an elasticity
of asset prices to investment of 2.
In order to parameterize the degree of price stickiness  we rely on the comparison
between the slope of the log-linear Phillips curve in our model, −1
  with that arising under
a Calvo-Yun set up, which is given by
(1−ˆ )(1−ˆ )
ˆ   where ˆ  is the probability of not resetting
the price in any given period. Given the values for the demand elasticity  =6 ,av a l u e
of ˆ  =0 75, which is compatible with most empirical evidence, the comparison delivers a
value for the price stickiness parameter in our model of  =
 ˆ (−1)
(1−ˆ )(1−ˆ ) ≈ 30 where  is
steady-state output.
Banks. To calibrate  we have calculated the average volatility of bank stocks over
the last 10 years (GARCH estimates and realized volatilities yield roughly the same result)
which is somewhat below 0.3, and multiplied this by the square root of 3, the ratio of the
maximum deviation to the standard deviation of a uniform distribution. We take 0.4 as our
benchmark.
One way to interpret  is to see it as the ratio of two present values of the project, the
ﬁrst at the interest rate applied to ﬁrms’ external ﬁnance, the second discounted at the bank
internal ﬁnance rate (the money market rate). A benchmark estimate can be obtained by
taking the historical pre-crisis values of the money market rate and the bank lending rate. In
the US over the last 20 years, based on 30-year mortgage loans, the spread has been around 3
percent. This leads to a value of  around 0.5. In the numerical simulations we have chosen
a value of 0.45. We parametrize the survival rate of banks,  at 0.97, a value compatible
with an average horizon of 10 years. Notice that the parameter (1 − ) is meant to capture
only the exogenous exit rates, not the failure rates. Finally, we use a benchmark value of
t h es o c i a lc o s to fab a n kr u n ,, of 0.1, equal to the direct costs of resolution estimated by
25James [17] on a sample of banks liquidated by the FDIC.
Shocks. The are three macro shocks in the model. The ﬁrst, a productivity shock,
is simulated in order to describe the transmission mechanism at work in our model. The
monetary policy shock is simulated to analyze the risk taking channel. Total factor pro-
ductivity is calibrated according to standard RBC processes: it evolves as an AR(1) of the
following form  = 

−1 exp(
),w h e r et h es t e a d y - s t a t ev a l u e is normalized to unity,
 =0 95 and where 
 is an i.i.d. shock with standard deviation  =0 008.W e t h e n
have an additive disturbance to the interest rate set through the monetary policy rule. The
monetary policy shock is assumed to be moderately persistent (coeﬃcient 0.2), as argued by
Rudebusch [24]. Based on the evidence presented in section 3, and consistently with other
empirical results for US and Europe, the standard deviations of the shocks is set to 0006.
Finally, log-government consumption evolves according to the following exogenous process,
ln
³


´
=  ln
³
−1

´
+ 

 where the steady-state share of government consumption,  is
set so that

 =0 2 and 

 is an i.i.d. shock with standard deviation . In accordance with
macro evidence for both the U.S. and Europe, we set  =0 007 and  =0 9.
6 Model analysis and results
We analyse our model along two dimensions. First, we verify, by examining its impulse
response functions25, whether our model reproduces the empirical evidence we presented
earlier. Second, to complete the assessment of the relationship between risk, monetary
policy and macro transmission and performance, we analyze the eﬀe c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h e
volatility of projects’ idiosyncratic shocks (, the investment projects’ risks in our model) on
the long run level of bank riskiness and output and on the volatility of asset prices and bank
25The ﬁgures show impulse response functions obtained through ﬁrst-order approximation of the model.
This choice is motivated by the need to provide impulse responses which are consistent with those in the
VAR, which is linear. Importantly, due to the endogenous nature of our bank risk, a risk taking channel
materializes in our model as ﬁrst order eﬀect of a decrease in the nominal interest rate. On the contrary,
the volatilities presented klater in the paper are computed with second-order approximations to take into
account the eﬀect of nonlinearities and the full cost of risk in our model.
26returns. As explained below, our model is able to replicate the relations that characterize
those variables in the data and in the past literature, but through a novel channel.
To begin with, to introduce the reader to the functioning of the model, Fig. 2 shows
impulse responses to a persistent 1% productivity increase.
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Fig. 2: Impulse response to a positive productivity shock
As expected output raises and inﬂation falls on impact, due to nominal rigidities. These
are standard results common to most RBC or neo-Keynesian-type models. The ensuing fall
in the policy rate, which is set according to a Taylor rule, triggers an increase in the deposit
ratio and in bank riskiness, as per equation 11. This happens for two reasons. First, the
increase in asset prices raises investment and the demand for bank loans. As a consequences
banks require higher external funding, that can be provided through demandable deposits
and/or bank capital. The fall in the nominal interest rate also implies that deposits become
a cheaper form of external ﬁnance, hence bank managers increase the fraction of lending
ﬁnanced by demand deposits. The ensuing increase in bank leverage comes along with an
increase in the size of the run region and the probability of bank runs.
We now examine the transmission of a contractionary monetary policy shock. Fig.
273 shows impulse responses to a 1% short term interest shock; solid lines (blue) show our
benchmark model with banking. As expected, output, investment and asset prices decline
on impact. Due to nominal rigidities, aggregate demand falls. An increase in the policy rate
reduces asset prices. In our model, by reducing banks’ balance sheet values, the decrease
in the asset price also induces a credit squeeze and a fall in investment (a balance sheet
channel). The risk taking channel on the funding side works as follows. The fall in asset
prices and investment triggers a fall of bank funding: this induces a fall in both  and 
As deposits are now a relatively more expensive form of funding, the deposit ratio, hence
bank risk, falls.
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Fig. 3: Impulse response to a monetary restriction (two models)
To better highlight the mechanisms at work in our model we compare these results
with those obtained with a standard dynamic neo-keynesian model without banks — dashed
(green) lines. The comparison reveals that in our banking model the short term impact of
a monetary policy shock is dampened. Bank risk in our model is contractionary; hence,
an expansionary monetary policy, in presence of an increase in bank risk, increases output
less than would be the case in absence of a risk taking channel. The fall in bank risk has
28indeed two eﬀects in our model. First, it reduces the resource costs Ω, hence inducing
an increase in total resources that tends to increase household consumption. Second, the
decline in the bank depositr a t i or e s u l t si na ni n c r e a s ei nt h eb a n ka s s e tr e t u r n
 that is
lower than the increase in the short term interest rate: this can be seen through equation
11. The dynamic of investment depends upon the dynamic of the return on capital, 
 :
when the latter is dampened, the dynamic of investment is dampened too. This second
eﬀect is reminiscent of empirical analyses showing that relationship lending tends to protect
borrowers from monetary shocks (e.g. Petersen and Rajan [22]). Notice that, contrary to
our empirical evidence, there is no "J curve" in the behavior of bank risk to monetary policy:
this is because our model does not distinguish between market-based and traditional deposit
funding, plus bank capital, on the bank liability side, but only between deposit and bank
capital.
Our model sheds new light on the widely explored links between risk on the one side
and ﬁnancial performance (as summarized by volatility and long run level of asset prices)
as well as macroeconomic performance (as summarized by volatility and long run level of
output) on the other. Several papers have discussed the eﬀect of an increases in asset risk
(triggered by the arrival of "bad news") on the volatility and the long run level of asset
prices and/or output. Generally speaking the literature ﬁnds that an increase in asset risk
triggers an increase in the volatility of both asset price and output and a fall in their long
run levels. These links have undergone much greater scrutiny after the ﬁnancial crisis. The
classic result of Campbell and Hentschel [11], that an increase in stock market volatility,
induced by an increase in investment risk, is associated with higher returns and lower stock
prices in equilibrium, has been re-examined recently, among others, by Bae, Kim and Nelson
[6] and by Fostel and Geanakoplos [16]. The ﬁrst paper tries to identify causality, looking at
whether it is asset risk, which by raising asset price volatility causes asset prices to decline
(as also suggested by Campbell and Hentschel), or else it is the low level of stock prices
that, by increasing leverage, drives stock market volatility up. The second paper shows, in
29a model with endogenous leverage and heterogeneous agents, that agents in normal times
have an incentive to leverage and invest in high-volatility-prone assets when bad news (of
increased risk on the tails) arrive. This in the long run also reduces the level of asset prices.
In addition, Bloom [7] shows that an increase in ﬁnancial risk increases output volatility
and reduces its long run level. We re-examine those links within our model which features
endogenous risk formation.
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FIGURE 4: Mapping between project risk (), bank risk, volatility
of 
 , volatility of the asset price and steady state output
One appealing feature of our model is that we can distinguish between asset or projects’
risk (which is captured by the volatility of shocks to projects’ returns, ) and endogenous
formation of bank risk (probability of bank runs). When projects’ risk rises, depositors
adjust their run region: such an adjustment process aﬀects the availability of funding to
bank, which in turn aﬀects the availability of credit to the economy as well as the long run
level and the dynamic of investment and output. To this purpose we examine the eﬀect of an
30increase in the risk of projects returns (as captured by the idiosyncratic volatility )o nt h e
long run levels and the business cycle volatilities for some variables, computed using second
order approximations of the full model to account for ﬁrst and second order eﬀects of risk in
our model26.
Figure 4 shows long run levels of bank riskiness and output and the volatilities of asset
returns (
 in our model) and asset prices, We see ﬁrst, in panel 1, that an increase in 
raises bank risk in the long run (probability of runs). This happens for two reasons. There
is ﬁrst a direct eﬀect: as the probability of extreme events raises, the runs region widens (see
equation 13). Second an increase in  induces an increase in bank leverage, see equation 11:
as the bank is more exposed to demand deposits, the probability of a run increases.
In the long run, higher risk is rewarded with higher return  (the steady state value
of 
 increases): the higher cost of funding induces entrepreneurs to reduce the demand of
funding, hence investment in the long run. This coupled with the increase in the log run
resource costs of bank risk, Ω reduces the long run level of output — panel 4 (expressed as
percentage output loss relative to the case in which bank risks are zero).
Let’s now examine the eﬀects of such shift in risk on business cycle volatilities. To
meet the higher level of long run returns, banks’ funding and ﬁrms’ credit availability shall
increase by more in response to risk-increasing shocks. This ampliﬁed response translates
into higher volatility of bank asset returns and asset prices, panels 2 and 3 (the values of
these volatility are congruent with the data). This is in turn associated with higher volatility
of output, investment and inﬂation (not shown).27
These results conﬁrm links already noted in past literature, but also highlights a new
channel that stems from the endogenous formation of risk: when investment project risk in-
creases, more bank runs materialize. This destabilizes bank funding and investment (raising
26To compute volatilities we considered the set of shocks described in the calibration section.
27For low levels of bank risk, the volatility of output ﬁrst declines before rising, as bank risk increases.
This concave shape is due to the fact that higher bank risk reduces the volatility of the interest rate net of
bank risks, which is the return relevant for consumer decisions in our model. Hence consumption volatility
initially declines before rising. Instead, investment volatility rises monotonically in the whole range.
31their volatility), and reduces output potential in the long run.
All together, these results can help interpret certain developments in the years prior to
the crisis. A sequence of positive productivity shocks, alongside with expansionary mon-
etary policy, increased bank leverage; the implication for bank risk was not appreciated
immediately by market participants, as witnessed by the fact that credit spreads and ratings
remained very favorable for a long period during the leverage buildup. The impact of the
monetary expansion on output was positive. But in the end, when risks built up in the econ-
omy and became entrenched, they manifested themselves in the form of high risk spreads,
high (downward) volatility of output and inﬂation. The model predicts, in addition, lower
steady state output and investment.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
As a consequence of the ﬁnancial crisis, a broad reﬂection is underway on the working of
the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in presence of ﬁnancial risks. There is a
growing perception that existing macro models that do not incorporate ﬁnancial sectors and
ﬁnancial risks cannot provide a convincing representation of the eﬀects of monetary policy,
particularly when the banking and ﬁnancial sectors are distressed.
We present new evidence linking monetary policy and bank riskiness through a risk
taking channel: lowering policy rates raises bank riskiness, particularly on the funding side.
We propose a model with banks runs and banks’ risk taking that reproduces the main
channels highlighted in the time series evidence. Overall, we highlight a new dimension of the
monetary policy transmission that calls reﬂection upon the long run unintended consequences
of protracted policy expansions and opens the avenue to a reconsideration of the optimal
policy design in presence of ﬁnancial risk.
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348 Appendix A. Expected Loss on Risky Deposits
When the probability of bank run is non-zero, the expected payoﬀ on deposits is below the
riskless return . Consider the payoﬀ of deposits per unit of funds intermediated by the
bank in two events: run for sure and no run (all other cases). In the ﬁrst case the payoﬀ is
(1+)(1−)(
 +)
2 . This holds in the interval of  comprised between [−;( − 
 )].T h e
expected value of this payoﬀ is 1
2
−
 Z
−
(1+)(1−)(
 +)
2 . This can be written, solving the
integral and using the expression for the probability of run , equation 13, as
(1 + )(1 − )
2
−
 Z
−
(
 + )
2
 =
(1 + )(1 − )
2
∙


 +
1
2
( − 
 )2 − 2
2
¸
= 
(1 + )(1 − )
2
µ


 +
 − 
 − 
2
¶
=
1
4
(1 + )(1 − )( + 

 − )
In the range of  in which the run does not occur, the payoﬀ is equal to ;i t s
expected value is obtained multiplying it by the probability of the respective event, (1−).
Overall, the expected payoﬀ on deposits per unit of intermediated funds therefore is
given by:
1
4
(1 + )(1 − )( + 

 − )+( 1− )
The expected loss on deposits, relative to the no-default state, per unit of intermediated
funds, is obtained by subtracting the above expression from , the contractual payoﬀ
 −
∙
1
4
(1 + )(1 − )( + 

 − )+( 1− )
¸
One can also calculate the expected return on deposits, i.e. the payoﬀ per unit of
deposits. This is equal to (1 − ),w h e r e = 1
4(1 + )(1 − )( +

 −)
 ).
359 Appendix B. Optimal Deposit Ratio
In order to show that the value of  that maximizes the function 9 is equal to 1


 +
2−+(1+),
we divide the  s p a c ea sf o l l o w s :
• Interval A:   (
 − );
• Interval B: (
 − )    
 − ;
• Interval C: 
 −    (
 + );
• Interval D: (
 + )    
 + ;
• Interval E: 
 +  .
We now analyse the function in each interval, in the following order: A, B, C, E, D. The
last one is where we will show the global maximum to be located.
• Interval A:   (
 − ). The function reduces to 1
2
 Z
−
(1+)(
 +)
2 .T h i s i s
independent of , hence the function is ﬂat and its level is equal to 1
2
 (1 + )
• Interval B: (
 − )    
 − . The function reduces to
1
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The ﬁrst derivative is 
4
£

  − (
 − )
¤
and the second derivative is
£
1
42

¤
,b o t h
positive for all admissible parameter values. Hence in this interval the function is
upward sloping and convex.
36• Interval C: 
 −    (
 + ). The function is equal to
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;
both are positive if and only if
(1−)2
 − ( +1 ) 0. The condition is satisﬁed if 
is zero, or else if  and  are suﬃciently low. For example, 05 and 03 are
jointly suﬃcient. For our parameterization, this condition is comfortably satisﬁed.
• Interval E: 
 +  . The function reduces to 1
2
 Z
−
(1+)(1−)(
 +)
2 .T h i si s
independent of , hence the function is ﬂat and its level is equal to 1
2
 (1 + )(1−).
N o t et h a tt h ev a l u eo ft h ef u n c t i o ni nt h i si n t e r v a li sl o w e rt h a ni ni n t e r v a lA .
• Interval D: (
 +)    
 +. In this interval the return to outsiders reduces
to equation 10. Consider this equation in detail. A marginal increase in the deposit
ratio has three eﬀects. First, it increases the range of  where a run occurs, by raising
the upper limit of the ﬁrst integral; this eﬀect increases the overall return to outsiders
by 1
2
h
(1+)(1−)
2 
i
. Second, it decreases the range of  where a run does not
occur, by raising the lower limit of the second integral; the eﬀect of this on the return to
outsiders is negative and equal to − 1
22
. Third, it increases the return to outsiders
for each value of  where a run does not occurs; this eﬀect is 1
2
⎛
⎜
⎝
 Z
−

1
2
⎞
⎟
⎠ =
1
2
³
−+

2
´
. E q u a t i n gt oz e r ot h es u mo ft h et h r e ee ﬀects and solving for 
yields equation 11. Since the second derivative is negative, this is a local maximum.
Note that this local maximum is within interval D if  1
2−+(1+)  1, a condition
37comfortably satisﬁed in our case. Given the shape of the function in the other intervals,
this is also a global maximum. QED.
T h eg r a p hb e l o wp l o t st h ef u n c t i o n9a g a i n s t for the following parameter values::

 =1 03;  =1 005;  =0 45;  =0 45;  =0 2.F o r 039, interval C vanishes,
unless  declines suﬃciently, but all other properties carry through and the global maximum
r e m a i n si ni n t e r v a lD ,a sd e s c r i b e d .
A B C D E
d
0.55
0.60
0.65
0.70
0.75
0.80
return to investors
Graph 3
In this interval, the expected payoﬀ to the capitalist, that enters in the bank capital
accumulation equation, is equal to


 =
1
2
 Z
−

(
 + ) − 
2
 =
(
 +  − )2
8
3810 Appendix C. Data Description
Variable name Description
ISM index Level of ISM index. Source datastream.
Employment De-trended logarithm of total employment in non farm
industries. Source: authors’ calculation and Datastream.
Commodity price De-trended logarithm of a commodity price index
inﬂation (Commodity Research Bureau Spot Index)
Source: authors’ calculation and Datastream.
Consumer price De-trended logarithm of Consumer Price Index
inﬂation (All items All urban areas).
Source: authors’ calculation and Datastream
Monetary policy rate De-trended eﬀective Federal Fund rate.
Source: Authors’ calculation and FED.
Uncertainty shock - Risk Realised volatility of the S&P500 index. This variable
captures the uncertainty shock of Bloom (2009).
Source: authors’ calculation and Datastream.
Bank Funding Risk Ratio market based funding to banks’ total assets. Market
based funding is the diﬀerence between total liabilities
(excluding equity capital) and customer deposits.
Source: Authors’ calculation and FED (Diﬀerence
between line 42 and line 31 of the table H8 for
Commercial Banks in the US).
Bank Asset Risk Percentage of banks tightening credit standards on
(only in the model at commercial and industrial loans to large and medium
quarterly frequency) enterprises.
Source: FED Survey of Terms of Business Lending.
Bank overall risk Realised volatility of the Datastream banking index for
the US. Source: authors’ calculation and Datastream.
Notes: The order of the variables in the table reﬂects the order of the variables in the VAR,
i.e. the shock to the macro variable is exogenous, while the shock on bank risk, the last shock,
is a combination of all the other shocks. The model is as close as possible to Bloom (2009).
The Estimation period of the baseline model is January 1985 — December 2008. De-trending has
been done with the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (= 14400). Realised volatilities over one month are
computed as the average of the daily absolute returns of the S&P500 over the month
39 
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